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HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE BELGRADE MEETING
Arthur J. Goldberg*
In September of 1977, President Carter asked me to take on
responsibility for what is familiarly called CSCE-the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Like most Americans, I
had previously thought of the CSCE in terms of the Helsinki
Summit of 1975 when President Ford signed the document called
the Final Act, a lengthy text, not a treaty, but an expression at
the highest political level of the commitment of the 35 states of
Europe and North America to respect certain principles of interstate behavior, to respect human rights, to build mutual confidence in the military sphere, and to cooperate in economic, humanitarian, informational, cultural and educational fields.
Many in the West were understandably cynical about the practical meaning of the inclusion in the Final Act of the principle of
"respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms including
the freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief." By the
formation of groups to monitor their own governments' performance, however, citizens of the Soviet Union, of Czechoslovakia, of
Poland, Bulgaria, and other countries in the East showed that
they took seriously this pledge and also the commitments to a
freer flow of people and ideas that were embodied in the humanitarian provisions of what is called Basket Three of the Final Act.
That the Belgrade conference would not pass quietly as just another routine diplomatic gathering was assured by the events in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, including the arrest and
the imprisonment of members of the monitoring groups and other
ethnic, racial, religious and political "dissidents".
The Belgrade meeting began October 4, 1977, and ended March
9, 1978. What did it accomplish?
In my opening address to the Belgrade meeting in October, I
spoke of giving detente a "humanitarian face and a human mea* Ambassador Goldberg, former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
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sure." For although we were in Belgrade to represent governments, we were obligated to address the problems of people as
well as of power. We deemed it essential to weigh the claims of
individuals, not just the interests of states.
Thus, we of the West explored the promises made at Helsinki
to respect the role of the individual and groups in monitoring the
implementation of the Final Act, to heal the wounds of divided
families, to facilitate the right of free emigration, and to better
the conditions in which scientists, journalists, scholars and businessmen work.
It was a shared belief of the Western countries that governmental actions which better the lot of individuals and smooth contact
between them are imperative to improve the ties between states.
Crucially, therefore, the Belgrade meeting dealt at length with
the question of human rights and fundamental freedoms. A person's freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief and the
ability of individuals and groups to exercise their civil rights effectively raised sensitive issues at Belgrade for almost all Eastern
countries. Their sensitivity was part of their significance. The
Belgrade meeting was the first to put those questions prominently
and legitimately into the framework of multilateral East-West
diplomacy.
That idea is a powerful one, and at Belgrade it won support
from the Western democracies. It also aroused strong opposition
from the East. We heard the contention that human rights are
purely internal affairs, that to discuss their observance in another
nation is to violate that nation's sovereignty, to interfere in matters that are no outsider's concern.
The Final Act refutes that reasoning. The Belgrade meeting has
made it untenable.
By virtue of Principle VII of the Final Act, human rights are
the direct concerns of all its signatories. Under the terms of the
United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenants-as well as the Final
Act-they are the subject of international undertakings. They
were then, without question, the proper subject of the diplomatic
examination and debate we had in Belgrade. And they will remain, after Belgrade, and at the 1980 meeting in Madrid, the
proper focus of continuing comment and efforts.
The pursuit of liberty is an unending enterprise and the surest
guarantee of security and of peace. What the Final Act obliged all
35 signatory States to pursue is what Aleksandr Pushkin defined
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long ago as a "better kind of freedom." That, he wrote, is the
freedom "not to bow your conscience, thought or neck to rank or
power. ..

."

That concept of individual dignity is still the vision

offered us by the Helsinki Accord, the vision all participating
States are pledged to respect and promote.
We know, however, that not all of the States have fulfilled that
pledge in full or in good faith. Western delegations, with varying
degrees of specificity, spoke at Belgrade of the broken and unfulfilled promises of Principle VII and Basket Three, the human
rights and humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. We
expressed our concern and our regret and-at times-our outrage
at the incidents which occurred in the East in direct contravention of the Final Act and in profound disregard of its provisions
in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The Belgrade meeting could not overlook such grave violations
of human rights, especially when unwarranted repression is directed against men and women whose only offense seems to be
that they have merely sought to monitor, enforce, or implement
the provisions and the promises of the Helsinki Final Act. Their
activity is encouraged by the Final Act. It needs to be protected,
not punished.
Thus, for example, we protested vigorously against the arrest
and confinement of Orlov, Scharansky and Ginsberg, members of
the Helsinki Watch Committee in the Soviet Union, Mykolo
Rudenko and Oleksei Tykhy, founders of the Ukrainian Helsinki
Monitoring Group, and the trial of other peaceful dissidents in
the East-religious, ethnic and political.
We expressed our deep concern about repression of Jews in the
Soviet Union, about measures taken against religious observers,
and political and cultural dissidents there and in other Eastern
European countries, about the jamming of radio broadcasts,
about the failure to permit adequate dissemination of Western
newspapers, books, and religious materials, and about the harassment of the Nobel Prize winner and esteemed scientist and champion of human rights, academician Andre Sakharov.
Specifically, in the review of the implementation at Belgrade,
we could not gloss over the plight of men and women of all faiths
harassed or persecuted for their religious beliefs and for trying to
pass those beliefs on to their children. Nor could we be silent
then or now-or in the future-when numbers of minorities are
denied their equality, particularly in their efforts to preserve the
language and culture which are essential to their special identity.
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We cannot pretend that such questions are irrelevant to the implementation of the Final Act and intrusive of the CSCE process.
We live in the real world, not one of make-believe. We cannot
make our world a better one if we turn a blind eye to its faults,
including our own.
Those faults-just as much as our accomplishments and opportunities-were the legitimate subject of the Belgrade review. That
review dealt with real shortcomings in Final Act implementation
so that from our examination ve could each and all move to remedial action.
The "trials," if they can be dignified by this term, and convictions of Orlov and Scharansky and other Helsinki monitors are a
gross violation of the Helsinki Final Act.
It is apparent that these trials and sentences are a direct result
of their activities in connection with the Helsinki Final Act. Orlov
and Scharansky were the founders of a group of Soviet citizens
who in 1976 came together to do studies and issue reports on the
Soviet Union's implementation of commitments undertaken at
the 1975 summit meeting of the 35 states of Europe, the United
States, and Canada, who participated in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Helsinki Final Act specifically recognizes the role that individuals acting on their own or
through non-governmental organizations can and should plan in
assisting governments to implement their Final Act obligations
more effectively. The Orlov group is so designed.
The Belgrade meeting ended March 9, 1978 with a pledge by
the participants, including the Soviet Union, "to implement fully,
unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally, all the provisions of
the Final Act." The trials and convictions of Orlov, Scharansky
and others and the gross interference with freedom of thought,
conscience, religion and belief bring Soviet and other Eastern
countries' good faith, with respect to this pledge, strongly into
question.
Harassment, including arrest, trial and conviction of individuals for their efforts to encourage their government to improve its
compliance with its international commitments, is a clear violation of the Helsinki Final Act. The Western democracies, as signatories to the Final Act, have a legitimate interest and a responsibility in expressing this concern.
The United States and other countries of the West had their
performance questioned at the Belgrade meeting, and some of the
questioning was constructive, for our own record of performance
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is by no means perfect. Questioning should aid our respective
countries to improve their record. I wish others were of equal
mind.
The United States and its NATO allies at Belgrade also took
careful note of the thoughtful ideas advanced by the neutral and
non-aligned countries for action consonant with the thrust and
spirit of the Final Act. Some such proposals can be set in motion
by unilateral action or bilateral agreement; many can be refined
and readied for decision in Madrid.
It is my strong belief that, in the days ahead, we should and
must continue to be especially attentive to the question of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought,
conscience, religion or belief.
We should manifest our great concern about those individuals
and organizations that are being denied these elementary human
rights. The list of those suffering repression is far too long. And
their fate arouses the greatest anxiety. Our concern cannot be
limited to any one country or one set of individuals.
"Injustice anywhere," said Dr. Martin Luther King, "is the enemy of justice everywhere."
The United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act enshrine the concept of justice-not privilege or power-ruling the
affairs of men and the relations between states. The Belgrade
meeting reaffirmed that central tenet in the context of detente in
Europe. Detente and the Gulag Archipelago cannot co-exist.
Helsinki aroused great hopes. In some quarters it also appears
to have aroused great fear. In Belgrade we, on our part, attempted to discuss both the hopes and the fears of governments
and peoples. We recognize that some hopes may not be as high as
they might have been when we went to Belgrade. But the road to
detente with a human face is a long and arduous one. And it has
been made even more arduous by Soviet aggression in
Afghanistan.
President Kennedy, some seventeen years ago, posed the ultimate question and stated the answer: "Is not peace, in the last
analysis, a matter of human rights?"

